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VALUATION IN CHAPTER 11
BANKRUPTCY: THE DANGERS OF AN
IMPLICIT MARKET TEST
Diane Lourdes Dick*
Large corporate debtors typically include broad legal disclaim-
ers in their financial disclosures to the bankruptcy court, such that the
valuation estimates they offer in support of a proposed plan of reor-
ganization are essentially meaningless. Some bankruptcy courts,
however, discourage parties from litigating valuation; instead, they
encourage them to negotiate, trusting that to the extent the debtor's es-
timates are woefully out of sync, the bargaining process will cause the
debtor to pursue a restructuring that rests upon a more accurate value
estimation. Meanwhile, these same courts interpret a lack of viable
challenges to the debtor's valuation estimates as evidence of their ac-
curacy: if the value of the debtor's assets truly exceeded the amount of
its liabilities, then large and powerful investors would enter the fray.
But this so-called "Implicit Market Test" is deeply flawed. This Arti-
cle uses a timely case study--the Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion of Allied Nevada Gold Corp.--to demonstrate how these reali-
ties of modern commercial bankruptcy practice threaten to erode
important safeguards in the Bankruptcy Code.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 2015, Allied Nevada Gold Corp. ("Allied Nevada")
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware.! The publicly traded company, a gold and
silver producer, controls one of North America's largest precious metal
mining operations at the Hycroft Mine in Nevada. 2 In its petition, the
debtor referred to its freshly prepared 2014 financial statements, report-
ing assets of $941 million and debts of $664 million, including nearly $345
million in unsecured bonds.3 These figures, which were released publicly
for the first time in the company's bankruptcy filing, diverged substan-
tially from the debtor's earlier public reports. For instance, the compa-
ny's 2013 financial statements-which were incorporated by reference in
disclosures pertaining to a new public stock issuance made a few months
prior to the bankruptcy filing 4-reported assets of more than $1.5 billion
and debts of approximately $736 million.' Additionally, a November 2014
project-feasibility study commissioned by the company estimated that
the Hycroft Mine would be worth $1.81 billion following a planned ex-
pansion (the "Hycroft Expansion").6
Although the company struggled with cash-flow problems that
threatened commencement of the Hycroft Expansion,7 in September
2014-just six months prior to the bankruptcy filing-management
boasted that the Hycroft Mine was on target to produce 250,000 ounces
of gold and nearly two million ounces of silver in 2014.8 Moreover, by the
debtor's own disclosures to the bankruptcy court, "[a]s of December
2014, the Debtors' proven and probable mineral reserves consisted of
10.6 million ounces of gold and 465.3 million ounces of silver."9 Consider-
ing spot-metal prices in 2015, these reserves had a potential market value
1. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del.
Mar. 10, 2015). Unless the context indicates otherwise, "Allied Nevada" and the "Debtor" refer to
Allied Nevada Gold Corp. and its debtor affiliates together.
2. Hycroft Mine, HYCROFT MINING CORP., http://www.alliednevada.comlhycroft-mine/ (last
visited May 30,2017).
3. Voluntary Petition, supra note 1, at 4; Allied Nevada Gold Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-
K) (Dec. 31, 2014), at 65 (listing $344,800,000 in Senior Notes).
4. Allied Nevada Gold Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-3) (Nov. 19,2014).
5. Allied Nevada Gold Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23 (Dec. 31,2013).
6. See M3, HYCROFT PROJEcr: NI 43-101 TECHNICAL REPORT MILL EXPANSION FEASIBILITY
STUDY 23 (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.alliednevada.com/wp-content/uploads/NI-43-101_Hycroft-
Feasibility-StudyRO3-Nov-14_COMPLETE.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Laura J. Keller & Cecile Gutscher, Swap Gone Bad Said to Push Allied Nevada
Gold to Hire Moelis, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-
06/dollar-swap-gone-wrong-said-to-push-allied-nevada-to-hire-moelis.
8. Denver Gold Conference, Allied Nevada Gold Corp.: Hycroft Mill Expansion Prefeasibility
Update, 3, ALLIED NEVADA GOLD CORP. (Sept. 14-17, 2014), http://www.alliednevada.com/wp-
content/uploads/DGG-2014.pdf
9. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization, Exh. D, Liquidation Analysis at 7, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr.
D. Del. Aug. 27, 2015).
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of $20 billion. 0 Yet, notwithstanding such large resource endowments,
the company apparently lost more than half a billion dollars of asset val-
ue in just one year.
In court filings explaining the decision to file for bankruptcy, man-
agement pointed to broader market conditions, such as the drop in gold
and silver prices from their historic highs, as well as to increasingly bur-
densome financial obligations arising under an out-of-the-money curren-
cy swap." The debtor also complained that it had been unable to obtain
financing for the Hycroft Expansion, a crucial step that would allow the
company to extract a greater share of its mineral reserves.1 2 Further con-
tributing to the debtor's apparent woes, declining asset values constituted
a technical default under its bond-indenture agreement, which required
that the company maintain a $437 million tangible net worth." This, in
turn, triggered cross-default provisions across the company's other major
financing instruments.1 4
On the surface, the story of Allied Nevada appears to reflect the
classic narrative of a company in Chapter 11: declining asset values and
challenging market conditions that lead to a cascade of defaults, giving
powerful lenders so much leverage that the company could not survive
without bankruptcy protection. This, however, is not a classic tale.
Through what is referred to as a "prepackaged" bankruptcy, the debtor
and its creditors negotiated in advance of the filing, agreeing to give the
company's bondholders virtually all of the equity in the reorganized
company in satisfaction of their claims and in exchange for certain junior
convertible/equity-based debtor-in-possession and exit financing." At the
same time, the draft offered the company's existing shareholders war-
rants to purchase up to 10% of the equity in the reorganized debtor;
however, pursuant to a so-called "death trap" provision, if they voted
against the plan, they would receive nothing.1 6
To be sure, shareholders were at a significant negotiating disad-
vantage from the outset of the case.17 Although an unsecured creditors'
10. See, e.g., INvEsTmENTMINE, www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices (last visited May
30, 2017) (showing the market prices for gold and silver in 2015 under the Precious Metals, five-year
tab).
11. Declaration of Stephen M. Jones in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and Various First Day
Applications and Motions at 11-14, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del.
Mar. 10, 2015).
12. Id. In first-day filings, the debtor estimated the cost of completion to be approximately $1.39
billion. Id. at 13. Later in the case, management stipulated that approximately $867 million of financ-
ing would be necessary to complete the expansion project. Declaration of Stephen M. Jones in Sup-
port of Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equity Security
Holders at 5, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 31,2015).
13. Annual Report, supra note 3, at 65.
14. Id.
15. Debtors' Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-
10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 24, 2015).
16. Id. at 19, 22.
17. They face the challenges described in Diane Lourdes Dick, Grassroots Shareholder Activism
in Large Commercial Bankruptcies, 40 J. CoRP. L. 1 (2014).
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committee was formed nine days after the bankruptcy filing,'" it would be
a full month before the U.S. Trustee would exercise its discretion to ap-
point an official equity committee." Even after an equity committee was
formed, committee members and other shareholders involved in the case
struggled to gain support from large institutional owners who remained
conspicuously absent from the proceedings.2 0
In July, following management's controversial decision to suspend
operations at the Hycroft Mine,21 the debtor removed the warrant clause
from the draft plan, leaving shareholders without any distribution. 22
When the newly appointed equity committee exercised its right to partic-
ipate in the case by requesting additional information and objecting to-
among other things-the draft plan and the debtor's decision to grant
executive bonuses, the debtor resisted the equity committee's discovery
requests and then countered with a scathing motion to disband the com-
mittee altogether.23 Referring to the committee's "scorched-earth tac-
tics," the debtor pleaded with the court: "enough is enough." 24 The equity
committee ultimately agreed to support a revised plan that gave existing
shareholders warrants for up to 17.5% of the equity of the reorganized
debtor.25
Meanwhile, an ad hoc group of individual shareholders-who
claimed that they collectively held more shares than the members of the
equity committee--sought to continue the fight against the plan. These
shareholders argued, among other things, that the debtor grossly under-
valued the company to use Chapter 11 to transfer ownership of the com-
pany without adequate consideration to shareholders. 26 They argued that
the debtor's plan-related disclosures failed to provide any reliable basis
18. Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re Allied Nevada Gold
Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 19, 2015).
19. Notice of Appointment of Committee of Equity Security Holders, In re Allied Nevada Gold
Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 10, 2015).
20. In stark contrast to most Chapter 11 cases of this magnitude, equity committee membership
was left entirely to individual shareholders with relatively small holdings. In fact, the debtor claimed in
one of its motions that the official equity committee members "aggregately own approximately 0.5%
of ANV's stock." Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equi-
ty Security Holders at 3, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 31, 2015).
21. Allied Nevada Gold Corp., Allied Nevada Suspends Mining Operations and Shifts Focus to
Process Operations and Mill Demonstration Plant, MARKET WIRED (July 8, 2015), http://www.market
wired.com/printerjfriendlyid=2036640.
22. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization at 5, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. July 23, 2015).
23. Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equity Securi-
ty Holders, supra note 20.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Notice of Agreements in Principle With Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and Of-
ficial Committee of Equity Security Holders, Exh. A at 3, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-
10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 19,2015).
26. See, e.g., Brian Tuttle, Allied Nevada Shareholders Question Barrick Gold's Involvement In
Bankruptcy, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 22, 2017) (noting that some shareholders, now on appeal to the
Third Circuit, are alleging the intentional misrepresentation of the value as part of a scheme to enter
into an agreement with Barrick Gold).
DANGERS OF AN IMPLICIT MARKET TEST
for the debtor's estimated valuation of the reorganized company.27 Yet,
notwithstanding the debtor's own admissions that it basically had no idea
what its assets were worth, the court confirmed the plan on October 6,
2015.28 In so doing, the court extinguished basic rights and entitlements of
the company's public equity investors, vesting ownership of the company
in bondholders.
The Bankruptcy Code is clear: an outcome of this sort is only lawful
if the company was actually worth as little as the debtor claimed.29 The
problem is that the bankruptcy courts that regularly hear large Chapter
11 cases" increasingly allow commercial debtors to submit financial dis-
closures that are riddled with disclaimers, and they almost always dis-
courage parties from pursuing expensive valuation battles in court. In-
stead, they trust that if the debtor's estimates are so out of sync with
economic realities, then private negotiations and market mechanisms will
produce a plan that ultimately rests upon more accurate value estima-
tions.3 ' Not every party in interest, however, is invited to the negotiation
table, and not every party to the negotiation has an incentive to dispute
the debtor's estimates. And, at least for some stakeholders, this process
of "negotiation" is really a process of litigation, with debtors assuming
.defensive postures to resist information sharing. When courts blind
themselves to these realities and assume that the lack of viable challeng-
es to a proposed plan means that the financial markets agree with the
debtor's valuation estimates, they readily dismiss stakeholders who at-
tempt to defend their interests, at times even treating them as scourges
upon the legal process.
Courts should reject these practices to ensure the proper function-
ing of important safeguards in the Bankruptcy Code. This Article uses a
recent case study to explore the valuation dilemma in Chapter 11. Part II
introduces the key elements of Allied Nevada's financial disclosures, in-
cluding valuation-related disclosures. Part III articulates the importance
of disclosures relating to the debtor's enterprise value and also considers
the modern judicial tendency to rely on private negotiations and implicit
market mechanisms to resolve valuation disputes. It then describes the
variety of incentives and disincentives that may lead parties to accept the
27. Objection-Debtors Amended Plan of Reorganization at 18-23, filed by Brian Tuttle, In re
Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015).
28. Order Confirming Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, In re Allied
Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6,2015).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2012) (setting forth the standards for determining whether
a plan satisfies the best interest of creditors test); id. § 1129(b) (setting forth the standards for deter-
mining whether a plan satisfies the fair and equitable test).
30. In most cases involving publicly traded debtor companies, the bankruptcy case will be filed
in the District of Delaware or the Southern District of New York. As Theodore Eisenberg and Lynn
LoPucki observed, increased forum shopping has led to a concentration of cases in these two jurisdic-
tions, with Delaware receiving the lion's share of large company filings. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn
M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reor-
ganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968 (1999).
31. This tendency to rely on private negotiations and market mechanisms is examined more
thoroughly in Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759 (2013).
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debtor's proposed plan, even if it rests upon incomplete valuation data.
Finally, this Article suggests ways to check the debtor's extraordinary
power and generate a more equitable commercial bankruptcy process
that better preserves the integrity of the financial markets.
II. VALUATION GUESSWORK: THE MODERN COMMERCIAL DEBTOR'S
SCANT FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
A. Allied Nevada: The Debtor's Liquidation and Valuation Analyses
Revisited
In Allied Nevada, the debtor introduced into evidence several doc-
uments intended to demonstrate the company's hopeless insolvency.
First, a liquidation analysis prepared by the debtor (the "Liquidation
Analysis") estimated total gross asset proceeds of approximately $176
million to $255 million in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.3 2 To the
extent the company achieved reorganization, a valuation analysis per-
formed by the company's independent financial advisor estimated the
value of the reorganized debtor to be $200 million to $300 million (the
"Valuation Analysis"). 33 Of course, even at the high end of these ranges,
the company's common stock would be worthless, as unsecured creditors
would not receive distributions sufficient to satisfy their claims. 3 4
On closer inspection, the debtor's financial disclosures are less than
convincing. At the outset of the case, the debtor-like most large corpo-
rate debtors-disclosed that it did "not have current market valuations
for its assets[, arguing it] would be prohibitively expensive, unduly bur-
densome, and an inefficient use of estate assets for the Debtors to obtain
current market valuations." 35 Moreover, in its plan-related disclosures,
the debtor conceded that, "except where specifically noted, the financial
information contained herein has not been audited by a certified public
accountant and has not been prepared in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles." 6
The debtor's 2014 financial statements were the apparent starting
point for many of the debtor's financial disclosures, including the Liqui-
dation Analysis and the Valuation Analysis. In accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles, these financial statements reflected vir-
tually all of the company's asset values at "cost" or "net book" value, ra-
ther than at fair market value.37 Moreover, the 2014 balance sheet re-
32. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization, Exh. D, Liquidation Analysis, supra note 9, at 3.
33. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization, Exh. E, Valuation Analysis at 1, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D.
Del. Aug. 27,2015).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C).
35. Statement of Financial Affairs for Allied Nevada Gold Corp. at 4, In re Allied Nevada Gold
Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 27,2015).
36. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization at 5, In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 27,2015).
37. Annual Report, supra note 3, at 48.
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flected nearly half a billion dollars in asset write-downs, with the largest
portion occurring with respect to the debtor's long-lived assets, including
plants, facilities, and equipment related to mine development.' In notes
to the 2014 balance sheet, the company explained that it:
reviews and evaluates its long-lived assets for recoverability annual-
ly and at interim periods if triggering events or changes in circum-
stances indicate that the related carrying amounts may not be re-
coverable. Events that may trigger a test for recoverability include
significant adverse changes to projected revenues, costs, or future
expansion plans."
Acknowledging that impairment tests of this sort are "highly sensi-
tive to . .. assumptions and inputs," the company identified the triggering
event as such: "During 2014, the Company was unable to secure the fi-
nancing required to begin construction of the mill expansion project
which significantly decreased the overall near-term probability of com-
pleting the mill expansion project and resulted in an impairment write-
down of long-lived assets."40 Accordingly, the company took an impair-
ment write-down of approximately $388 million with respect to the Hy-
croft Expansion,4 1 and a $42 million write-down with respect to stockpiles
of ore that had been extracted from the mine and required further pro-
cessing through a mill.4 2
In determining the amount of these write-downs, the company re-
lied on internal data and assumptions that are considered to be highly
susceptible to bias and manipulation. "As of December 31, 2014, follow-
ing the impairment charge, the mill-related long-lived assets were carried
at their estimated net realizable sales value, which the Company deter-
mined represented their estimated fair value."4 3 Another note explained:
The fair value of the Company's mill-related long-lived assets at
December 31, 2014, which was determined utilizing an estimated
net realizable sales value approach, totaled $75.7 million and con-
sisted primarily of tangible crusher components, the mills them-
selves, and motors and mill drives. Due to the uniqueness of the
mill-related components and the fact that there is little to no market
activity for identical or similar assets, the estimated fair value of
Company's mill-related components are classified within Level 3 of
the fair value hierarchy.""
The Financial Accounting Standards Board describes Level 3 inputs as
the lowest priority inputs, as they are "unobservable" and therefore less
precise.4 5 "Unobservable inputs" are not based on independent sources
38. Id.
39. Id. at 56.
40. Id. at 61-62.
41. Id. at 62, 76.
42. Id. at 60.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Id. at 76.
45. Id. at 55.
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but on "the reporting entity's own assumptions about the assumptions
market participants would use."4
The Liquidation Analysis and the Valuation Analysis were similarly
riddled with assumptions, qualifications, and disclaimers. Notably, the
Liquidation Analysis-which was based on net book values of assets as
reported on the company's 2014 balance sheet-assumed an estimated
recovery rate of 38% to 58% on property, plant, mine equipment, and
ore, based in part upon management's assumptions as to the value of a
prospective purchaser's option to complete the Hycroft Expansion. 47
Among other things, "[m]anagement's valuation of the option to develop
the Hycroft Expansion ... reflects ... the estimated incremental $766.6
million capital cost required to construct the mill."48 The 2014 write-
downs, however, had already taken into account the financing costs of
the Hycroft Expansion and the inherent uncertainties surrounding the
project. In this way, the Liquidation Analysis seems to have twice dis-
counted the debtor's single largest tangible asset class. 49
Meanwhile, the Valuation Analysis provided that the "estimated
enterprise value ... does not purport to constitute an appraisal or neces-
sarily reflect the actual market value that might be realized through a
sale or liquidation of the Reorganized Debtors, its securities or its assets,
which may be significantly higher or lower than the estimated enterprise
value range herein.""O Rather, as is traditionally the case in Chapter 11,
enterprise value is based on the reorganized company's earning capacity
rather than underlying asset values.s' The opining firm explained that, in
estimating future earning capacity, it relied on the debtor's financial
statements and other information provided by the debtor, and
did not assume any responsibility for independent verification of
any of the information supplied to, discussed with, or reviewed by
[us] and, with the consent of the Debtors, relied on such infor-
mation being complete and accurate in all material re-
spects .... [A]t the direction of the Debtors, [we] did not make any
independent evaluation or appraisal of any of the assets or liabilities
... of the Reorganized Debtors.52
46. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE: FAIR VALUE
MEASUREMENT No. 2011-04, at 50 (2011), https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/00/7534500.pdf.
47. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization, Exh. D, Liquidation Analysis, supra note 9, at 3.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Individual shareholders raised these and other arguments. See generally Brief of Stoyan
Tachev in Support of Objection to the Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Allied Nevada Gold
Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 5, 2015); Objection-Debtors Amended Plan of Reorganiza-
tion, supra note 27.
50. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization, Exh. E, Valuation Analysis, supra note 33, at 1.
51. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941) ("The criterion of
earning capacity is the essential one if the enterprise is to be freed from the heavy hand of past errors,
miscalculations or disaster, and if the allocation of securities among the various claimants is to be fair
and equitable.").
52. Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reor-
ganization, Exh. E, Valuation Analysis, supra note 33, at 2.
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Nowhere does the Valuation Analysis disclose, however, whether, and to
what extent, the analysis offsets the debtor's earlier asset write-downs.
This is important because the 2014 write-downs were based on the debt-
or's difficulty in obtaining financing for the Hycroft Expansion, but the
reorganized debtor would emerge from bankruptcy with a plan in place
to secure the needed financing and complete the project."
Because of the numerous assumptions, qualifications, and exclu-
sions, Allied Nevada's valuation estimates were-like those provided by
most commercial debtors-essentially meaningless. Pivotal financial dis-
closures rested upon subjective and untested assumptions. But when the
official equity committee attempted to gain access to more information
by engaging in discovery, the debtor assumed a defensive litigation pos-
ture, resisting requests on the grounds they were "overly broad and un-
duly burdensome."5 4 For instance, when the committee requested, among
other things, information and documentation relating to the Valuation
Analysis-a pivotal instrument that purported to lend credence to the
debtor's plan of reorganization-the debtor objected to producing any
materials prepared by the investment banking firm on the grounds that
such documents constituted expert reports." Similarly, when individual
shareholders attempted to continue the fight by raising these and numer-
ous other criticisms in their objections to the proposed plan,6 the debtor
responded by calling their critiques "baseless" and premised upon "rank
speculation.""
On deeper inspection, the arguments are frustratingly circular. Alt-
hough the debtor complained that the equity committee was being "val-
ue destructive" in its attempts to engage experts and thoroughly evaluate
the debtor's business and financial information," it later accused object-
53. It was also unclear whether the Valuation Analysis took into account the future value of the
debtor's substantial net operating loss ("NOL") carryovers, most of which were generated by the
debtor's 2014 asset write-downs. Earlier in the case, the debtor estimated its federal income tax NOLs
to be approximately $177 million. Debtors' Motion for Interim and Final Orders Establishing Notifica-
tion and Hearing Procedures for Transfers of Certain Equity Securities at 3, In re Allied Nevada Gold
Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 10, 2015). Pursuant to the U.S. Tax Code, NOLs. can be used
to offset future tax liability to improve liquidity. Assuming a corporate federal income tax rate of 35%,
these NOLs could reduce the debtor's future tax liabilities by approximately $62 million. The debtor,
however, subsequently explained that the NOLs were deliberately not taken into account due to man-
datory reductions in valuable tax attributes in respect of the debtor's anticipated cancellation of in-
debtedness income. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation and Omnibus Reply to Ob-
jections to Confirmation of the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization at 45, In
re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. 15-10503 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015). The Liquidation Analysis
also declined to take NOLs into account, presumably because most deferred tax assets are nontrans-
ferable and thus would not survive liquidation. On the treatment of NOLs in Chapter 11 cases, see
Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy's Corporate Tax Loophole, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 2273 (2014).
54. Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equity Securi-
ty Holders, supra note 20, at Exhs. 5 & 6.
55. Debtor's counsel further drives home this point in a March 23rd letter to the U.S. Trustee.
See id. Exh. 1.
56. See sources cited supra note 49.
57. Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation and Omnibus Reply to Objections to Con-
firmation of the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, supra note 53, at 40.
58. Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equity Securi-
ty Holders, supra note 20, at 3.
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ing shareholders of failing to offer any "independent expert testimony or
admissible evidence regarding [the company's] enterprise value," stating
that "none of the Objecting Shareholders purport to be experts them-
selves," and stating further that their arguments rested on nothing more
than inadmissible lay opinions about technical matters that require ex-
pert testimony." In support of the latter claim, the debtor cited two deci-
sions from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York, which both reiterate the importance of expert testimony in light of
the "inherently subjective and fact-intensive nature of valuation and pro-
jection of profits."a
Of course, given that individual shareholders would have had to use
their own funds to retain experts-with no guarantee of reimbursement
from the debtor's estate-it is unreasonable to expect that they should
obtain expert testimony and put forth a successful valuation trial simply
to show that the debtor had not satisfied its own burden of proof. More-
over, by this late stage of the proceedings, they faced profound strategic
disadvantages. The debtor's financial disclosures had already served as
justification for the debtor's decision to file for bankruptcy, bolstering its
claims of hopeless insolvency and laying the groundwork for it to accuse
the official equity committee and the individually objecting equity hold-
ers of interfering with the restructuring and attempting to extract nui-
sance settlements.
Nonetheless, the Allied Nevada court was apparently persuaded by
the debtor's arguments, as it ultimately overruled the individual share-
holders' objections without demanding more detailed disclosures from
the debtor or making an independent investigation of the company's re-
organization value.6 1 In this way, the case highlights the true dangers of
scant financial disclosures in Chapter 11: they give debtors an extraordi-
nary, and potentially unchecked, power to control the restructuring and
alienate stakeholders, even after they have gained a seat at the negotia-
tion table. Debtors can use this tremendous discretion to transfer value
to preferred stakeholders with hardly any meaningful disclosure. Be-
cause of this, the practice of Chapter 11 bankruptcy may, at least in the
nation's busiest corporate bankruptcy venues, be moving far away from
the statutory protections that the drafters believed necessary for fair and
equitable bankruptcy reorganization.
B. A Ready Response: An Implicit Market Test
Those who believe that Chapter 11 bankruptcy serves as a healthy
extension of fully functioning financial markets have a ready response.
59. Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation and Omnibus Reply to Objections to Con-
firmation of the Debtors' Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, supra note 53, at 41.
60. Id. at 41 n.97.
61. See In re Allied Nevada Gold Corp., No. BR 15-10503-MFW, _ F. Supp. 3d -, 2017 WL
587741, at *1, *4 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2017) appeal pending (describing the bankruptcy court's overruling
of the motion to stay the confirmation hearing).
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They argue that any fairness concerns relating to meaningless disclosures
are illusory because all proposed plans of reorganization are subject to
vigorous market tests. For instance, an argument of this sort was made by
Allied Nevada's counsel, who rebuffed claims that creditors would re-
ceive a "windfall deal" on the grounds that "the [Debtor's] unsecured
notes are trading at well under par evidencing that sophisticated inves-
tors believe they will be significantly impaired under a plan."62 The Third
Circuit acknowledged the same argument in a 2007 case: if a "bondhold-
er thought [a debtor company] was solvent, they wouldn't [sell] their
debt [for less than par]."6 3
Allied Nevada's attorneys further explained that "[a]ny stakeholder
or third party can offer an alternate proposal, which the Debtors would
be required to consider in the exercise of their fiduciary duties."' Thus,
the argument posits that if there is any material likelihood that a debtor's
proposed plan grossly undervalues the company, large and powerful in-
stitutional stakeholders would resist the plan; if they decline to do so, dis-
tressed investors would acquire debt or equity stakes and intervene to
fight on behalf of all residual claimants. Even if they cannot rely on the
debtor's estate to finance their intervention, such ostensibly large and
sophisticated arbitrageurs would assume the costs themselves. In other
words, objectors should be expected to demonstrate an investment-
backed belief that the company is worth more than the debtor claims.
The argument is naturally appealing; it frees bankruptcy courts from
the uncomfortable task of confirming plans on the basis of admittedly
weak disclosures, inviting them to interpret lack of dissent by more so-
phisticated parties as a signal that the financial markets agree with the
debtor's valuation estimates. In the following Part, I take up arguments
of this sort, exploring the reasons why this and other "Implicit Market
Tests" are not only unreliable, but also pose a major threat to the fair-
ness and efficacy of the bankruptcy process.
III. DISCUSSION
Allied Nevada presents an opportunity to reexamine the theoretical
assumptions that underlie Chapter 11's approach to valuation issues that
arise in large and complex commercial reorganizations. The cases invite
judges, practitioners, scholars, and lawmakers to question the fairness
and efficacy of an emerging practice that gives debtors the power to offer
vague and subjective valuation estimates to support plans of reorganiza-
tion, all while disclaiming the very purposes these financial disclosures
are intended to serve.
62. Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equity Securi-
ty Holders, supra note 20, at Exh. 2.
63. VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624,632-33 (3d Cir. 2007).
64. Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official Committee of Equity Securi-
ty Holders, supra note 20, at Exh. 1, at 3.
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Of course, bankruptcy courts could simply hold debtors to the letter
of the law and demand that they provide meaningful disclosures. Debtors
have an affirmative duty to provide "adequate information," and wheth-
er the debtor's disclosures meet this standard must be determined from
the investor's perspective." Although the Bankruptcy Code acknowledg-
es that debtors need not always engage in full and exhaustive disclosure,
there is considerable gray area and courts have room to exercise their
discretion and demand more thorough disclosure in light of the facts and
circumstances of a particular case." Where a debtor resists, the court
could then take the more drastic step of appointing a trustee and/or an
independent examiner to conduct an appraisal of the debtor's assets.6 7
Yet the courts most likely to hear large corporate bankruptcy cases
rarely do anything of the sort. Instead, they rely on other powerful par-
ties-typically secured creditors' and unsecured creditors' committees
and, to a far lesser extent, equity holders-to conduct their own investi-
gations and to vigorously oppose plans that rely on wildly off-base valua-
tion estimates. To be sure, in many large and complex Chapter 11 cases,
parties spend enormous amounts of time and resources retaining experts
and fighting over valuation, such that if and when they eventually reach
consensus, the court may rightfully assume that the final proposed plan
rests upon a more accurate assessment of the debtor's reorganization
value.
But then what about cases like Allied Nevada, where creditors have
no incentive to put up a fight and large equity holders are inexplicably
absent from the proceedings? Here, the court seemed to rely on what I
call an "Implicit Market Test," whereupon it interpreted the lack of via-
ble challenges to the debtor's valuation estimates as evidence of their ac-
curacy. By "viable challenges," I mean objections by sophisticated parties
with market power in the capital and/or securities markets who have the
means to offer alternative valuation data. Because this test takes into ac-
count the size of market actors, it naturally impairs smaller stakeholders.
For instance, when individual parties-such as retail shareholders-
defend their interests by attempting to show that the debtor has failed to
meet its burden of proof, they not only have to overcome the opposition
65. See, e.g., Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314,
321-22 (3d Cir. 2003).
66. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). Under that section, "adequate information" means
"information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature
and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records, including a discussion of
the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any successor to the debtor,
and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or interests in the case, that would enable
such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan." Id.
The statute also acknowledges that "adequate information need not include such information about
any other possible or proposed plan and in determining whether a disclosure statement provides ade-
quate information, the court shall consider the complexity of the case, the benefit of additional infor-
mation to creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional information." Id.
67. On the role of, and ethical issues surrounding, a court-appointed examiner in Chapter 11
cases, see Daniel J. Bussel, A Third Way: Examiners as Inquisitors, 90 AM. BANKR. L. J. 59 (2016);
Daniel J. Bussel, Ethics for Examiners, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 2073 (2016).
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of those who show up in court to challenge them; they also have to prove
wrong the countless large investors who declined to join their cause." In
this way, the court essentially took judicial notice of the market, which
apparently speaks loudly through its silence: if the value of the debtor's
assets truly exceeded the amount of its liabilities then large and powerful
investors would have entered the fray.
This approach is elegant in its simplicity. It suggests that the value
of a company is an inherent virtue, universally recognizable through de-
ductive reasoning. It proposes that, notwithstanding the sparseness or
unreliability of the debtor's financial disclosures, market participants can
readily deduce the true value of the company and use this knowledge to
decide whether and to what extent they should intervene in the bank-
ruptcy case.
But this logic is flawed. For one thing, business valuation involves
expensive and time-consuming comparisons and analyses. 9 In a large and
complex bankruptcy, the debtor-in-possession is in the best position to
subject its assets to a thorough, independent appraisal, and to develop a
proposed plan that takes these findings into account. Moreover, while
market participants regularly engage in their own valuation analyses with
respect to debtor companies, their assessments are intended to advance
investment goals rather than to achieve a fair and equitable outcome in
the bankruptcy. Thus, even if they believe that a proposed plan vastly
undervalues a company, their return on investment calculations must al-
so weigh the costs of intervening in the case and the likelihood of success.
Allied Nevada-a fast-tracked, prepackaged bankruptcy with strong
support from a sophisticated creditor class-is not an attractive value
play for most equity investors. This is not to mention the fact that market
participants-including large shareholders-may also hold creditor posi-
tions or otherwise be conflicted based upon their other portfolio invest-
ments. All of this suggests that whether to take up a fight in bankruptcy
court is a calculated decision and a highly imperfect measure of Wall
Street's concurrence with the merits of the debtor's claims.
In contrast, the bankruptcy court is tasked with confirming a fair
and equitable plan.7 0 The bankruptcy process confers a tremendously
valuable opportunity for debtors to restructure their finances. Just as the
early courts of equity reminded plaintiffs they must bring their claims
with "clean hands," so too should bankruptcy courts demand that debt-
ors make full and meaningful disclosures for the benefit of all stakehold-
ers. Precisely because state-law rights can be legally compromised in
bankruptcy, the process requires much more disclosure than is generally
required in out-of-court restructurings." Earlier in Chapter 11's history,
courts recognized the importance of the debtor's obligation to provide
68. See generally Dick, Grassroots Shareholder Activism, supra note 17.
69. See generally IAN RATNER ET AL., BUSINESS VALUATION AND BANKRUpTCY (2009).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
71. This is the so-called "fish bowl" quality of bankruptcy. See Alan S. Trust, Bankruptcy as a
Fish Bowl of Disclosure, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2010, at 48.
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meaningful disclosures. For example, in a 1985 decision, the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York explained, "it is cru-
cial that a debtor be absolutely truthful [in its] disclosure statement."7 2
The Third Circuit noted in 1988 that the obligation to provide thorough
information "cannot [be] overemphasize[d]."' In the same year, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio reminded parties
that "[t]he disclosure statement was intended by Congress to be the pri-
mary source of information upon which creditors and shareholders could
rely in making an informed judgment about a plan of reorganization." 7 4
But if Allied Nevada is any indication, modern bankruptcy prac-
tice-at least as it unfolds in large public company cases-may be slip-
ping away from these core principles. Commercial debtors typically in-
clude broad disclaimers in their financial disclosures; then, far from
conveying a spirit of openness, they actively resist other parties' attempts
to gain access to information. Moreover, although debtors routinely ac-
cuse equity committees of performing unnecessary work, they also belit-
tle dissenting shareholders for failing to obtain sophisticated expert re-
ports." Judges are probably sympathetic to these critiques because of
earlier concerns that Chapter 11 allows shareholders to leverage their
procedural rights into distributions even when they are clearly underwa-
ter. 6 But as the bankruptcy process has evolved,' and as dominant credi-
tors command far greater influence over restructurings," there is less of a
case for restraining equity holders.
Yet debtors continue to raise and exploit our historical misgivings
over equity participation in Chapter 11 cases, urging strict adherence to
an Implicit Market Test. They ask that courts presumptively exclude
shareholders from the negotiation table, and then look incredulously up-
on any dissenting party who is unwilling to invest his or her own money
to attack the proposed plan. By surrendering to these demands, modern
courts weaken the Bankruptcy Code's plan-confirmation provisions,
which were designed to protect the state-law rights of all claimants and
interest holders." This Implicit Market Test not only undercuts the pro-
tections put into place for the smallest stakeholders, but it also makes an
overall mockery of their attempts to defend their interests by encourag-
ing courts to confirm plans on the basis of perceived Wall Street "whis-
per" valuation numbers that small investors lack the ability to discern.
72. In re Galerie Des Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd., 55 B.R. 253,259 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
73. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414,417 (3d Cir. 1988).
74. See In re Scioto Valley Mortg. Co., 88 B.R. 168, 170 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
75. Id. at 170-71.
76. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990).
77. See Harvey R. Miller, Bankruptcy and Reorganization Through the Looking Glass of 50
Years (1960-2010), 19 BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 1 (2010), https://www.americancollegeofbankruptcy.
com/file.cfm/68/docs/Harvey%20Miller%20Keynote%20lAddress%202010.pdf.
78. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors
in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1155, 1158 (2011).
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), (b) (2012).
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For these reasons, courts should limit their reliance on Implicit
Market Tests. Tests of this sort are especially inappropriate with respect
to the decision whether to initially appoint or subsequently disband an
official equity committee. Unless there have been allegations of fraud
and a bankruptcy trustee or examiner has been appointed, an equity
committee should be formed and retained if the debtor's most recent au-
dited financial statements reflect positive stockholders' equity. And in all
cases in which the debtor's disclosures to the bankruptcy court deviate
dramatically from its prepetition disclosures, Implicit Market Tests
should not be used to support rulings on any motions or objections, in-
cluding those relating to plan confirmation. In this way, debtors would
essentially be forced to stand behind their earlier disclosures to investors.
Implicit Market Tests should be used-if at all-only in those cases
where the debtor's financial disclosures are consistent with its prepetition
disclosures and the court is confident that the debtor has satisfied its ob-
ligation to make adequate disclosures. In those cases, tests of this sort
may enhance the bankruptcy process by empowering judges to rule on
motions or objections in an efficient and expeditious manner.
Moreover, in all Chapter 11 cases-but especially those that involve
large, publicly traded companies-judges should carefully examine
whether debtors are making sufficient disclosures to support a plan that
extinguishes state-law rights and entitlements. Although sophisticated
market participants and their attorneys may be familiar with standard
contract disclaimers, disclosures can become so riddled with legal dis-
claimers that they ought to be deemed facially inadequate. In light of the
importance of the debtor's disclosures, the line between adequate and
inadequate disclosures should be more clearly drawn so that courts know
when it is necessary to make independent investigations as to enterprise
value.
Of course, judicial valuation is admittedly a costly and imprecise ex-
ercise," and, although judges can control costs by limiting the amount of
trial time, the number of witnesses, and by streamlining the issues
through the motion process, they may also prefer to rely on market
mechanisms to provide additional cues as to the debtor's true worth. But
they should utilize explicit rather than implicit devices. For instance,
judges may explore Professor Bebchuk's well known options approach to
corporate reorganizations." Likewise, they might employ postconfirma-
tion pricing mechanisms, such as the volume-weighted, average-price ap-
proach." Under this device, a portion of the equity shares in the reor-
80. Professor Sharfman highlights these and related problems. See, e.g., Keith Sharfman, Judicial
Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32 FLA. ST. UNIv. L. REv. 387 (2005); Keith
Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV.
357 (2003).
81. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV.
775, 785 (1988) (proposing a corporate reorganization process pursuant to which stakeholders receive
options rather than pure shares in the reorganized company).
82. A similar method was used in In re Dana Corp., Inc., No. 06-10354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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ganized company are held in escrow pending a "true up" process that
calculates the value of the company based on the post-confirmation mar-
ket price of the stock over a specified period.8 3 These reserved shares are
then later distributed to parties, such as shareholders, who are later de-
termined to have been shortchanged in the restructuring.4 Similarly,
courts might subject proposed plans to a mandatory auction period,
whereupon any internal or external investor may acquire at face value
the claims of creditors who stand to receive equity in the reorganized
debtor. Such a process would ensure that creditors receive full satisfac-
tion of their claims, while allowing the market to determine the value of
the company's upside potential.
Finally, as a potential middle ground between the disclosure prac-
tice reflected in Allied Nevada and full-blown judicial valuation, courts
can require an auditing of the debtor's financial disclosures and the pro-
posed plan in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards or,
at a minimum, review by an outside independent licensed auditor who
can attest in a so-called comfort letter" to the principal financial inputs
and calculations. Devices of this sort would provide more direct assur-
ance to the court, while also alleviating the fairness concerns raised in
this Article.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through its growing reliance on what I call "Implicit Market Tests,"
an emerging bankruptcy practice privileges large stakeholders with mar-
ket power at the expense of smaller stakeholders. Advocates of these
Implicit Market Tests acknowledge that inequitable outcomes may some-
times occur, but nonetheless believe that all market participants benefit
from the efficiency gains. Of course, parallel reasoning can be used to
support eradication of Implicit Market Tests: although administrative
costs will necessarily increase, all participants stand to benefit from fair
and equitable restructurings. So why does modern bankruptcy practice
continue to err on the side of efficiency rather than fairness? Maybe the
real question is, when bankruptcy courts hear commercial restructuring
cases, are they acting as courts of law in pursuit of justice, or are they
serving as glorified boardrooms where sophisticated parties strike deals
with the force of law? Until these questions are addressed, Chapter 11
will continue to generate stories like Allied Nevada, which ought to dis-
turb anyone who hopes for a just system.
83. See Marshall S. Huebner & Damian S. Schaible, Valuation in Chapter 11: Overview and
Tools for Consensual Resolution, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL (June 26, 2009), https://www.davis
polk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/677la85a-00c8-4d69-blfb-lb5263b2edeclPreview/Pub
licationAttachment/3aca3008-f6cO-4c9d-addd-le5l83eOb0la/INS09_Chapter-2_Davis-Polk--
Wardwell.pdf (describing this valuation method under section B.i.).
84. Id.
85. Comfort letters are thoughtfully explored in Rene Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters:
The Legal and Business Implications, 104 BANKING L.J. 313, 325 (1987).
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